It was obvious from the mid-1960s that the character of the country would change in a major way because of all the forces of modernity.
In fact, the government of the day was well aware of it. A report was commissioned to determine the best way forward and that report was duly ignored.
Since then there have been other reports, other attempts to plan for the future for rural Ireland, but at every junction, a plan to cater for all the people into the future was torn up in the name of short-term political gain. What is happening now was due to occur up to 20 years ago, but much of it was delayed, and many of the problems now emerging were masked, during the frantic building boom.
The changing character of the country could not really be avoided, but it could have been managed properly. Rural Ireland would then not have to be subjected to the systemic withdrawal of services, and, to some extent, the withdrawal of the State, from many areas.
Back in 1966, a firm of English town planners, Colin Buchanan and partners, were commissioned to set out a regional strategy for development in the country. The commission was actually awarded by the UN on behalf of the Irish government.
Buchanan looked at four possible options for development. The first involved concentrating on Dublin. That was quickly discounted. The second involved two other regional centres, Cork and the Limerick/Shannon area. This was given due consideration. The third was to develop these regions and six others, and the fourth was to scatter everything to the four winds.
A report from a symposium in 1970 on Buchanan laid out that the final option was simply not on. It “offered in theory the chance of somewhat higher levels of population and employment than present policies in the areas which have suffered most from emigration”, the report stated.
“In practice, however, it seemed clear that it would not be possible to get such a large share of industrial development to the areas in greatest need of it, with the result that many new projects would fail or be diverted to other countries, so that the areas with high emigration would be likely to get only a fraction of the help intended, and the country as a whole would suffer from the consequences of a very much slower rate of economic growth.”
By then, Buchanan had been published two years previously, and had caused a huge flurry of debate. The option chosen was the one designed to develop the nine centres which, apart from Dublin, Cork, and Limerick/Shannon, included Waterford, Dundalk, Drogheda, Galway, Sligo, and Athlone.
These would be designated growth centres in which inward investment would be targeted.
The plan made perfect sense and faced up to the reality of the grinding future. If it had been followed, there could have been proper regional development, and a secondary plan to cater for outlying towns, rural areas, the development of agriculture and small manufacturing industries could have followed.
It would have been painful initially, but would have benefited the country as a whole, and particularly the rural areas.
Naturally, the sensible and universally beneficial option was not taken. In 1972, the government effectively ignored Buchanan and continued with a haphazard regional investment policy. Political pressure won the day. There would have been short-term pain with implementation. The government would have taken a hit. The opposition would have made hay. In such a scenario, the welfare of the population as a whole is regarded as entirely secondary.
Life moved on. The world changed, but attitudes in political circles to regional development continued to stagnate. The real world did, however, keep intruding. As a result, another stab was made at coming up with a comprehensive regional strategy.
Ulitmately, this took the form on the National Spacial Strategy. This recommended the development of gateway towns for investment. Along with Dublin, Cork, Limerick/Shannon, and Waterford — which had been targeted in the National Development Plan 2000-20006, the NSS identified “linked gateways” of Letterkenny, Dundalk, Sligo, and the Midlands towns of Athlone, Tullamore, and Mullingar.
One element of development in these towns was to be the decentralisation of government. Again, all of this made perfect sense. It would have allowed for regional development which could then identify how the more rural areas could be accommodated. Again, it would have meant some painful decisions. There would be anger in the towns that would have lost out. In the Midlands, for example, a decentralisation programme would have had to probably accommodate just one of the three towns in the NSS. However, decentralisation of a small portion of government functions might have provided a springboard for development in these centres.
In 2000, the minister for finance, Charlie McCreevy, announced that 10,000 civil servants would be decentralised. There followed a scramble in up to 130 urban centres around the country to get a piece of the action. While this was unfolding, the minister for the environment, Noel Dempsey, was announcing the NSS, citing the mistakes made in not implementing Buchanan, and claiming that the Irish people were now “mature” enough to comply with a balanced regional development.
No they weren’t. Neither were their politicians.
In December 2003, McCreevy put the kibosh in the NSS by announcing that the 10,000 would be scattered to 53 different locations, most prominent among them the constituencies of serving ministers. In one fell stroke, he did for the type of policy priority required to push ahead with the NSS.
Fatally undermined, the NSS lost much of its impetus. It still exists as official strategy, but in essence we are back where we were when the Buchanan report was torn up.
As with much else, the building boom masked the natural decline of rural Ireland. With employment in many main centres, whole legions of people remained in rural centres and commuted to plentiful work and the services industries that accompanied the boom.
Those days are gone. The jobs have dried up. When the tide went out on the boom, rural Ireland was exposed to some harsh elements. On top of all that, the regime of austerity and cutbacks hit vulnerable sections such as rural Ireland the hardest. Instead of a managed rearrangement of priorities, and services, there was a cull.
Now the decline of rural Ireland is regarded in political circles as a problem to be fixed rather than an inevitability that could be managed in a proper way that benefits all. In dealing with the issue, the mistakes of the past should first be acknowledged. After that, there is a lot of work to be done.
Michael Clifford
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